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THE TURKISH AID BAN: REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT
by A. A. Fatouros
Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 has had continuing
repercussions: on the island itself, where forty percent of the territory is still
under Turkish occupation and the two communities have had to absorb over
two hundred thousand refugees; and in Greece, where the military junta's
inability to cope with the fruits of its own crimes led to its downfall and to a
return to parliamentary government -- which now faces war threats from its
eastern neighbor. Its side-effects were felt even in the United States, where it
became the occasion for a remarkable confrontation between the President
and Congress.
It is to this last event, itself still unfolding, that the present article is
devoted. It starts with a brief discussion of the historical facts and of the
issues in the United States law that provided the formal basis for the con-
frontation, then moves to a review of related events in and out of Congress
and of the arguments used by the two sides. The essay concludes with a dis-
cussion, and an interpretation, of the whole incident, including an assessment
of the role of the so-called "Greek lobby" in the United States.
The Turkish Attack on Cyprus
The facts of the invasion are well known and need little further rehear-
sal. The opportunity for Turkish action in Cyprus was provided by a coup
d'etat organized by the military junta then in power in Athens, through the
mainland Greek officers in charge of the Cypriot National Guard. Although
Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, managed to escape, thus
foiling one of the military's principal aims, the putschists took over the
government and appointed as their president Nicos Sampson, an extremist of
the right, noted for his hatred against both Makarios and the Turks and for
his fanatical passion for enosis (union with Greece) at any price. The Turkish
reaction was as swift as it was predictable: on the early morning of July 20,
1974, five days after the coup, Turkish armed forces landed on the island.
The shock of the invasion did what active and passive popular resistance had
failed to do. Sampson in Cyprus and the military junta in Athens collapsed
and were replaced by parliamentary leaders. A shaky ceasefire was eventually
arranged on Cyprus and equally shaky negotiations began in Geneva, under
British auspices, between Greece and Turkey and the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities. On August 14, Turkey renewed military action, ending
up in control of forty percent of the island's territory, including its most
productive areas. Since then, the island has been divided: the Northeast is in
the hands of the Turkish army, with a few thousand Greek Cypriots remain-
ing in a few enclaves. The Southern part of the island is under Greek Cypriot
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control; all Turkish Cypriots have moved away and one hundred and eighty
thousand refugees (out of a total Greek Cypriot population of less than
520,000) have found refuge there.
The question of the degree of involvement of the United States Govern-
ment in the coup and the ensuing invasion is at best open; at worst, complic-
ity of various kinds and degrees has been changed. 1 Some possible positions
and interpretations have been conveniently classed by Professor Theodore
Couloumbis into five "Theories."2 They range from the State Department's
official "innocent bystander" view ("we did our best, but . . ."); to the
"Terrible blunder" theory of Kissinger's critics in Congress and most of the
press; to a "Realpolitik" version, stressing Kissinger's "divide and conquer"
role; to the theory pointing at the continuity in American policy concerning
Cyprus, as manifested in particular in the 1964 Acheson plan for partition of
the island and its successors; to a final conspiracy theory, which attributes
everything to well-laid American plans. There are indeed further categories or
subcategories possible, especially when realistic attention is paid both to the
likely or known plans and intentions of the United States and its various
agencies and to "perverse," that is to say, partly independent, action by its
client governments. 3 Even if only the tip of the iceberg were, taken intc
consideration, i.e., the official statements and actions of the United States
Secretary of State and his associates, repeated and otherwise puzzling failures
and continued mishandling of the situation can easily be documented. 4 This
problem is not the topic of my paper; I shall not therefore attempt to settle
the issue here.
The Legal Context of the Aid Ban
A multitude of legal issues surround the current problems of Cyprus. 5
Of these, only one will be briefly examined here, because of its relevance
to the topic at hand, namely, the legal basis for the suspension of United
States military aid to Turkey. 6
Since 1962, the United States Foreign Assistance Act includes a pro-
vision which, in its present form [22 U.S. Code, section 2314(d)] , runs as
follows:
Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or de-
ense services furnished such country under [this Act, or other
ralated Acts] in substantial violation of the provisions [ of certain
sections of the Act, specifying the purpuses of aid] or any agree-
ments entered into pursuant to such Acts shall be immediately
ineligible for further assistance.
The principal purpose specified by the various legislative provisions and
by the bilateral agreements in force between the United States and Turkey
are internal security, self-defense, and action in conformity with UN recom-
mendations or -decisions. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus cannot fit under any
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of these headings and the United States Government, as will be seen, has virt-
ually admitted this.
Seen in broader context, the clause in question is a clear illustration of
the hegemonic relationship between the United States and its allies or clients.
The latter are provided, under rather favorable terms (partly in the form of
grants, partly in the form of sales credit and for cash), military equipment.
But they can use it only for certain purposes, never spelled out with any pre-
cision. Thus, in addition to uses which are clearly allowed (such as "internal
security"), there are many doubtful ones. No method or institution is pro-
vided for determining the facts, when they are disputed, or for applying the
law to undisputed facts. The very vagueness of the legal concepts involved
leaves a considerable margin for compromise between the recipient and the
United States, which frequently reales the point of total disregard of the
provisions and purposes in question.7 Yet the United States remains, by
default, the sole judge. It is in a position to invoke at any moment the,
provisions in question and stop aid. The threat to do so is thus a major bar-
gaining instrument for the United States (as it is, of course, for other
hegem onial. powers.)
The record of application of sec. 2314(d) in the past is spotty and
inadequately documented. On a number of occasions, the United States has -
interrupted aid to recipient countries (e.g., to Pakistan and India, when they
were at war with one another). On the other occasions, not all of which are
known, the threat of an aid cutoff was expressly used. It was, for instance,
used by President Johnson in his letter of June 5, 1964 to the Turkish Prime
Minister, in connection with a threatened invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. The
President reminded the Premier of the requirement in the bilateral agree-
ment between the two countries that United States consent must be obtained
for any use of military equipment "for purposes other than those for which
such assistance was furnished." And he went on to state:
I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot
agree to the use of any United States supplied equipment for a
Turkish intervention in Cyprus, under present circumstances.8
The threat was certainly effective that time; although resented by
Turkey, it did not lead to any serious change in its position vis-a-vis NATO,
the United States, or the Soviet Union. No such threats were made in 1974,
although it was widely known that an invasion was being prepared.9 The
possibility of an aid cutoff was raised only in connection with a possible war
between Greece and Turkey. As Secretary Kissinger put it, in an "informal
news conference," on July 22, 1974, when a brief cease-fire had been
arranged on the island:
Q: Mr. Secretary, did you threaten to cut off military aid to both
Greece and Turkey in order to get them to accept the cease-fire?
Secretary Kissinger: I made clear on Saturday in San Clemente
[at a July 20 news briefing] that no war would be fought be-
tween NATO allies with an orren American supply line. So this
put a limit to the escalation that could be conducted. As to the
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other steps that were taken, there were no specific threats made.
It was very clear that we would consider a continuation of a
military confrontation between NATO allies as a very grave
matter. 10
As to a Turkish invasion, however, no cutoff was mentioned:
Q: Mr. Secretary, before the Turkish invasion did the United
States warn the Turkish Government that it would lose aid
if it moved, military aid?
Secretary Kissinger: No, but we made very clear that we were very
strongly opposed to military action. 11
Much later, Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco gave a somewhat
different version which can be squared with that of his principal with great
difficulty -- only by emphasizing its qualifications and evasions rather than its
apparent affirmations. On being reminded of the 1964 Johnson letter and
asked whether he delivered "substantially the same message" to Turkey in
1974, the Under Secretary responded:
I don't want to use any analogies but it was very, very clear
on the basis of what I said in Ankara that one of the possible
results of military intervention was the cutoff of aid. I don't want
to mince mords about it. 12
After the second Turkish attack on August 14, 1974, Secretary Kissinger
insisted once again that such threats were not used. He explained at length:
The United States did not threaten the cut-off of military aid to
Turkey, for these reasons: First, it was considered that such an
action would be ineffective and would not prevent the threaten-
ing eventuality; secondly, as was pointed out in this statement,
we are giving economic and military aid as a reflection of our
common interest in the defense of the eastern Mediterranean.
Once such a decision is taken, it will have the most drastic con-
sequences and not just over a period of time covering a few days
but over an extended period of time. For all these reasons, it was
judged that the United States would be both ineffective and
counter productive to threaten the cutoff of aid. Short of this,
however, we made the most repeated and urgent representations
to Turkey in order to prevent the military action that happened.
We have criticized the action, and we believe also that the inflex-
ibility of all parties in Geneva contributed to it. 13
At the same press conference, on August 19, 1974, the issue of the applicabi-
ility of sec. 2314(d) was brought up by a journalist. Kissinger responded that
he would "have to get a legal opinion on that subject" and that he had not
done it yet. 14 That "legal opinion" had a sad fate. A team of lawyers under
the former legal adviser of the Department of State, Carlyle E. Maw, was
indeed charged with a legal study. However, they reached the conclusion that
there was no way to avoid the application of sec. 2314(d), that is to say, aid
to Turkey had to be cut off. Secretary Kissinger rejected the advice and never
released the legal opinion. 15 By December, 1974, the Department of State
was stating that "it was impossible publicly to express a legal conclusion on
the issue of Turkey's eligibility for further assistance and sales." 16
In the meantime, the issue was raised in Congress. At the very
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beginning, after the July 20 invasion, several resolutions condemning Turkish
action were introduced, but they did not refer to sec. 2314(d). Crnly at the
end of August was the legal question raised, in Congress and in the press. The
Administration temporized but soon came to admit, although never publicly
or expressly, that continuing aid to Turkey was, under United States Law,
illegal. On September 19, 1974, in a closed meeting with the Democratic
caucus of the Senate, conveniently leaked to the press, Secretary Kissinger
admitted that the "preponderant view" of the State Department lawyers was
in agreement with Senator Eagleton's opinion that continuing aid was in
violation of the law. This memorable exchange then followed:
Senator Eagle ton: If my opinion is the dominant and right one,
do you have any choice but to enforce it, or to seek its change
by legislative process?
Secretary Kissinger: We are exploring our options and will consult
with the appropriate Congressional leaders.
Senator Eagle ton: Do you have any alternative but to obey the
law?
Secretary Kissinger: If your legal opinion is correct, it will have
very adverse foreign relations consequences for an important
ally.1 7
The Congressional Debate
Accordingly, by the early fall of 1974, the terms of reference of the
political debate were set. They changed little over the next year. Two main
periods of Congressional activity may be distinguished, the first untilthe
suspension of aid on February 5, 1975, the second from that time until the
decision for the partial lifting of the ban, on October 2, 1975. There were
some interesting, although not fundamental, differences in the argumentation
on the two sides during each of these two periods.
By early October 1974, both houses of Concress had passed an
amendment tied to a continuing appropriation resolution which provided for
suspension of all military aid, sales and deliveries to Turkey until the Presid-
ent of the United States certified that Turkey was in compliance with U.S.
foreign aid legislation and that "substantial progress" was being made toward
agreement concerning military forces on Cyprus. Proponents of this provision
had to light off a last-minute effort of Congressional leaders substantially to
weaken the amendment. They were then faced, on October 14, 1974, with a
veto by the President, which they were unable to override. A second version
of the amendment was again vetoed three days later. Finally a compromise
was reached and the President signed an amendment requiring a halt of aid
but allowing the President, virtually at his sole discretion, to suspend the aid
cutoff until December 5, 1974. The date was later moved to February 5,
1975, in new amendments attached to another continuing appropriations
resolution and to the annual foreign assistance act.
When the cutoff date came, the Administration complied with the aid
ban, although it sought to minimize its impact by providing increased aid as
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the cutoff date approached and by promoting the provision of military
equipment to Turkey by Western European NATO countries. It also embark-
ed on a new Congressional effort, spearheaded by the Senate foreign affairs
leadership of both parties, to pass a bill removing the specified cutoff date
from the related provisions, thus giving the President the power further to
suspend the aid ban. The bill was reported out to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on March 26, 1975, and passed the Senate by a vote of
41 to 40 on May 19, 1975. It reached the House floor in late July, after
considerable amendment in the House International Relations Committee.
In its final form, it only allowed delivery to Turkey of equipment it had
already paid for; further sales or aid would be permitted only by the next
annual foreign assistance act. Despite these amendments, the bill was defeated
in the House, on July 24, 1975, by a vote of 223 to 206.
Administration efforts to reverse the House decision started immediate-
ly afterwards. They intensified as Turkey proceeded to close some United
States bases in its territory and to place the rest under formal Turkish
control. On July 31, the Senate approved, again by a single vote's majority
(47 to 46), a new bill, identical to the one rejected by the House. The
intention was to force a vote in the House before adjournment for the
summer but the opposition by some representatives foiled these plans. Debate
on the bill started again in the fall. Finally, on October 2, 1975, the Admin-
istration's bill was approved by the House, by a vote of 237 to 176.
When the Foreign Assistance Act for fiscal 1976 came up for discus-
sion, a few months later, controversy was much less heated. Administration
proposals provided for grant aid and cash and credit sales of military equip-
ment to both Greece and Turkey ($50 million in military grants and $110
million in military sales for the former and $75 million in grants and $130
million in sales for the latter). At the time of writing, the bill had passed both
House and Senate but had not yet become law. Grant aid of $50 million to
each country and military sales of $110 million for Greece and $125 million
for Turkey was approved. However, sales to Turkey are limited in time and
are subject to a number of conditions regarding Cyprus: observance of the
cease-fire, no increase of Turkish military forces or civilian population on the
island, and no transfer of U.S. supplied equipment to Cyprus. The President
must determine that those conditions have been met on a case-by-case basis
for each sale and communicate his findings to Congress.
The Arguments on the Two Sides
For our study of the argumentation of the defenders and opponents of
an aid ban we rely on congressional documents and on press reports. It is
appropriate to note here that the position of the mass media on the issue at
hand followed a peculiar path. At the earliest phase of the debate, in late
summer and early fall of 1974, the more influential newspapers and several
of their columnists took strong positions against the illegality of continuing
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aid to Turkey and, expressly or by implication, in favor of an embargo. Their
stand became increasingly milder in the ensuing months and, by the start of
1975, a radical reversal had occured. Directly or indirectly, in their over-
whelming majority, the mass media adopted a position identical, for practical
purposes, with that of the Administration. Every time a vote in Congress on
this issue approached, a cloud of editorials and comments advocating the
lifting of the embargo and attacking the alleged influence of the "Greek
lobby" would appear. So that Congressional proponents of an aid ban found
that their stand -- which remained unchanged -- was, if the press were taken
seriously, highly popular in mid-1974 and most unpopular a few months
later. Such a radical change of position over a short time gives the impression
that the Administration's efforts at manipulation of the mass media were, in
this instance, successful.
The argumentation on each side of the issue remained rather simple and
straightforward during the first phase of the debate. Opponents of the aid
embargo generally avoided touching on the legal issue, i.e., on the illegality of
continuing aid to Turkey. They used instead policy arguments: the likely
negative consequences of an aid ban, the need for flexibility in dealing with
both Turkey and Greece, the dangers from Congressional interference with
the conduct of foreign affairs by the President. The President's veto messages
in October 1974 are typical: they eschew any mention of the legal issues and
stress instead that an aid cutoff would lessen the influence of the United
States, diminish its ability to persuade the parties to negotiate and jeopardize
NATO interests. On the rare occasion that Congressional opponents of the aid
ban referred to the legal question, it was to point out rather casually that the
facts, or the law, were not all that clear, or to suggest vaguely that the aid
cutoff provision should be applied to Greece as well as Turkey.
Proponents of the aid ban, on their part, focussed almost exlusively on
the legal issue. They stressed the illegality of further aid and the need to
respect law. Occasionally, they referred to the plight of the refugees on
Cyprus and the need for the United States action. In their emphasis on illegal-
ity, they generally referred solely to United States law; they did not try to
build a case for the illegality of Turkish action under international law, or
under the UN Charter. Their emphasis was exclusively domestic.
Once the aid ban went into effect, and especially after the bill against it
passed the Senate, the President and his Secretary of State undertook an
all-out campaign to change the position of the members of the House of Rep-
resentatives. More than a hundred Congressmen were invited to the White
House in successive mass breakfasts to hear the President and Secretary
Kissinger develop the reasons for continuing aid to Turkey. Their argument-
ation followed two basic directions: It stressed the great importance of
Turkish bases for the United States defense posture and it pointed at an
increase in. Turkish intransigence on the Cyprus issue as long as the aid ban
was enforced.
Strategic information concerning the bases was selectively leaked to the
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newspapers to support the view that, United States bases in Turkey being
designed to collect information from the Soviet Union through electronic
means, they were precious and irreplaceable. It was even argued that the
bases in Turkey were necessary to insure the application of the disarmament
and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.
The rigid Turkish position on Cyprus, on the other hand, was presented
as an affirmation of national independence and of unwillingness to submit to
foreign pressures. There was no suggestion that the Turkish attitude reflected
an agressive or expansive position. The President and his Secretary of State
stressed, in rather untypical manner, the need to respect the independence of
American allies and to avoid intervention in their political affairs. Moving to
more realistic argument, they attributed Turkish reluctance to negotiate on
Cyprus to the country's political instability. All this, according to them,
showed that the aid ban had totally failed as a method of exercising pressure
on Turkey and that only the continuation of aid would give to the Turkish
government the ability to make concessions concerning Cyprus, without
appearing to submit to external pressures. Continuation of aid was therefore
to the advantage of all interested parties.
At this point, the executive argumentation began to move in an inter-
esting direction -- although always indirectly and not for "attribution." Its
audience was assured that the common benefits which flow from the contin-
uation of aid to Turkey were well understood by the Greek government; this
was the reason why the latter was not opposing the suspension of the aid ban.
These assurances were not new; similar arguments were made much earlier.18
But in the spring and early summer of 1975 these assertions built up in inten-
sity, were repeated to anybody who wanted to listen, and reached the public
through the columns of friendly commentators. The Greek government, and
in particular the Washington embassy, kept for a long time its usual "correct
attitude," and refused to comment in public on the problem of tht. aid ban.
Yet, a few days before the July 24 vote in the House of Representatives, the
issue reached such proportions that the Greek Ambassador to Washington
felt obliged to issue a brief statement:
It has come to my attention that doubts have been created
in the minds of members of the House of Representatives con-
cerning the position of the Greek government on the resumption
of arms shipments to Turkey by the United States. It is clear that
it is not up to me to interfere in the relations between the legisla-
tive and the executive branch of this country. It is equally clear,
however, that nobody save the responsible representatives of the
Greek government is empowered to express its positions. I should
like to state in this connection that the position or the Greek
government is known and that it cannot have changed, since the
factual circumstances which determined it have not changed.19
Although somewhat oblique, the statement was unmistakeable in its
intent. It did not receive much publicity in the American press, but seems to
have had some impact.20
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Closely related to the official assertions concerning the position of the
Greek government was the insistence on the role of the so-called "Greek
lobby." We shall return to this topic, but it should be noted now that, in a
sense, the publicity given by the Greek-American community and its leaders
to their campaign for the interruption of aid to Turkey served well Secretary
Kissinger's plan. His supporters did not stop stressing the dangers facing
American national policy because of the activities of ethnic lobbies. The hints
as to the understanding of the United States position by the Greek govern-
ment were often coupled with disapproval of "chauvinist" pressuns , by the
"Greek lobby."
The legal arguments in support of the aid ban were difficult to refute,
so the opponents of the aid ban continued to try to evade them. They now
referred to the legal argumentation occasionally used by Turkey, concerning
application of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, without, however, wholly
adopting it or approving the Turkish position. They only noted that the
Turkish invasion did have some legal basis. During this second. phase of the
debate, there was no attempt to deny that the continuation of aid was in
violation of United States legislation. During debate in Congress, several of
the aid ban's opponents began by admitting the illegality of aid and then
proceeded to make whatever other arguments they could. Another set of legal
arguments had to do with Greece and its alleged violations of the conditions
for the supply of American aid. They mentioned the introduction of person-
nel and equipment in Cyprus from 1963 to 1967, as well as the removal of
supplies from the naval base in Crete during the summer of 1974 -- informa-
tion on which had been very conveniently leaked to the press. The lack of
detail and clarity in these allegations is interesting, if only because it shows
that the officials responsible were still more interested in keeping secret
United States involvement or toleration of client governments' activities
than in winning this particular argument.
The proponents of the aid ban responded in the main by stressing once
again the illegality of the continuation of aid. They pointed out that, if
pressure through the aid ban had not been effective, this was due to Secretary
Kissinger's negative stance, to his opposition and undermining of the Con-
gressional decisions, which encouraged the Turkish government in its intran-
sigence. On the legal arguments, they responded by distinguishing between
the landing of Turkish forces on July 20, 1974, and their attack on
August 14, 1974. They argued that, as to the first, it could be argued that
there was some legal basis, in view of the provocation by the Athens military
government. But there were no such excuses for the second action, which had
no legal basis and was in clear violation of U.S. law. Finally, proponents of
the aid ban stressed the importance for Congress and the United States of
resisting Turkish "blackmail" through threats of the closing down of bases.
Some False Approaches
To place the debate concerning Turkish aid ban in its proper political
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and constitutional framework it is useful to begin negatively with a brief
account of what this debate was not.
The debate did not express any radical differences of opinion between
the President and Congress (or a majority of its members) concerning the
fundamental directions of the United States foreign policy. There are, of
course, several differences, and they are sometimes of importance, but they
are of many kinds and point to several directions. Progressive or reactionary
positions are not divided symmetrically between the executive and the
legislative branch. The views and arguments of the Representatives, Senators,
and other politicians who supported the aid ban show clearly that their
basic positions and biases coincide in substance with the positions and ideol-
ogy of United States foreign policy as it has been established since the end of
the Second World War. In their argumentation, there is no opposition, or even
doubt, concerning NATO and its functions, concerning the leading role of the
United States in the "free world," the need for military aid to friendly
countries, the fundamental anti-Communist direction of American foreign
policy. Some of them disagree with some of these positions. Others disagree
with the specific handling of the Cyprus issue during the summer of 1974, or
more generally with Secretary Kissinger's policies. Many have been stressing
that Greece is a better ally than Turkey or that its bases are more useful than
the Turkish ones. To support this position, they invoked the opinions of
various retired officers, such as General Van Fleet and Admiral Zumwalt. --
persons whose name symbolize the continuity as well as the problem of
American policy in Greece during the last thirty years. The views of the aid
ban proponents are clearly within the bounds of established policy and ideol-
ogy, they do not subvert them, they do not even tend to change them to any
serious degree.
The aid ban debate does not reflect, therefore, a disagreement between
those who support a foreign policy which favors and utilizes direct and in-
direct intervention in foreign countries and those who condemn such
intervention. Disagreement on this issue begins to acquire considerable
importance in current American political life; but it plays no serious role
here. No choice between an interventionist and a noninterventionist position
arises: both the continuation and the interruption of aid to Turkey constitute
methods for interference in the affairs of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus (al-
though Secretary. Kissinger tried to show that only the cutoff of aid constitu-
ted intervention.)
It is characteristic of the lack of any profound ideological differ-
entiation on this topic that the continuation of aid to Turkey was supported
by several Representatives and Senators who in earlier years had struggled
strongly and effectively against the dictatorship in Greece. On the other hand,
although the leadership of the aid ban campaign was in the hands of
Representatives Rosenthal and Brademas and Senator Eagleton -- there were
in their camp several others who had in the past tolerated, supported, or
eulogized the Greek military junta.
14
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The Role of the "Greek Lobby"
Another interpretation of the Turkish aid ban episode treats it prim-
arily as a manifestation of "ethnic politics." The so-called "Greek lobby" is
credited (or charged) with a successful campaign of political pressure on
vote-conscious Congressmen. As has been said, there are three million Ameri-
can citizens of Greek origin in the United States and only a few thousand
of Turkish descent. The actual role of the Greek-American community in the
whole affair is difficult to assess with any precision; yet it cannot be ignored.
Pressure from the Greek-American community, united and mobilized for the
first time in recent decades, undoubtedly played an important role. But it is
easy to exaggerate its importance and its effectiveness. In the absence of
thorough empirical studies, 21 some fragmentary personal observations seem
in order.
Certain distinctions must be made among Greek-Americans (and Greeks
resident in the United States) who participated in the campaign for an arms
embargo to Turkey. Several groups or categories may be distinguished. In
discussing them, all too briefly, particular attention will be paid to each
group's position toward the military dictatorship which ruled Greece from
1967 to 1974. Such consideration of the groups' political orientations does
not merely reflect my own concerns and biases. In view of the definite
connections between the junta's Cypriot coup d'etat and the Turkish inva-
sion, an individual's or a group's attitude toward the junta had definite effects
on its behavior concerning the aid embargo.
A first, small but important, category includes politicians of Greek
descent, members of Congress as well as other professionals of politics
(former government officials, administrative assistants of legislators, etc.).
These are in the main highly assimilated individuals, distantly, if at all,
, attached to their parents' original homeland. Yet, while other factors (e.g.,
desire for increased political visibility, creation of an "ethnic" political
base, opposition to Henry Kissinger's foreign policy) may have played roles
of varying importance in each case, ethnic origin was undoubtedly an
important factor in the decision of some of them to lead the efforts for an
arms embargo. It is interesting to note that the relationship of some of these
politicians with the other categories of Greek-Americans discussed below was
not always close, and sometimes not even friendly. Especially those among
them who had taken a strong stand against the Greek dictatorship had often
found themselves attacked by the leaders of Greek-American organizations.
Finally, it should be noted that many Greek-American politicians, especially
those who hold, or have held, important non-elective offices -- the political
"technocrates" if you will - did not participate in the campaign against
Turkish aid.
15
The second main group consists of the Greek Orthodox Church of
America and its leaders. A separate long study would be needed for a proper
analysis. The power of the church is much greater among earlier immigrants,
and generally among older people, than among more recent immigrants and
young people. In fact, during one of his frequent visits to Greece during the
dictatorship, the Archbishop complained that Greece was sending to the
United States in recent years too many "communists" (meaning presumably
people who did not easily fit into the traditional parish patterns of the
North American church). The church's institutional role and activity during
the seven-year reign of the military junta was generally favorable to it. Not
only had the church leadership no difficulty in accepting the military
government as the legitimate successor to earlier Greek governments, but it
multiplied its contacts with it and its trips to Greece, it allowed the utiliza-
tion of the churches as centers for the distribution of propaganda materials,
and kept at a distance all groups opposing the dictatorship. Only in 1973,
after the replacement of King Constantine by Colonel Papadopoulos as
formal head of state, did the Archbishopric begin to express certain doubts;
even these, however, did not reach the point of protest against the junta's
repression or tortures in Greece or of any increased tolerance of local mani-
festations in support of Greek resistance.
In the efforts concerning the Cyprus issue the role of the church was
predictably conservative. At the start, the effort was made to limit any grass-
roots participation to charitable activities ("clothes for the refugees"), leaving
any active political role to the (church) leaders. This attempt did not work,
but the church kept trying to limit and "keep within proper bounds" any
public manifestations or political action. Open condemnation of the past
American policies, or any emphasis on the role of the junta was avoided. The
symbol of Greek Cypriot resistance to outside pressures from friends and
foes, Archbishop Makarios, was rarely mentioned: At a memorial service for
the Cypriot dead in the fall of 1974, Archbishop Iakovos achieved the diffi-
cult feat of speaking for half an hour on Cyprus without mentioning once his
brother prelate's name. Finally, the church leadership grasped this opportun-
ity to reassert its role as leader and representative of the Greek-American
community, as regards both United States political structure and the new
Greek Government.
The third category includes traditional Greek-American organizations
and associations (some of which are of general membership, while others are
based on the place of origin of the immigrants). It is hard to determine the
actual importance of these organizations in the life of the Greek communities
today. Their constituencies are largely the same as those of the church: earlier
immigrants and older people; their leaders are often those who have had some
financial success. How representative that leadership is, in terms of the entire
Greek-American community, is open to question. During the dictatorship in
Greece, the majority of the officials of these asssociations, whether because
of traditional anti-Communism or for other reasons, supported and defended
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the junta, stigmatizing as anti-Greek the efforts of those who tried to oppose
it. It is highly probable that the great majority of the associations' members
had a much more temperate, or perhaps indifferent, stand.
In the campaign concerning Turkish aid, the Greek-American associa-
tions' action was somewhat stronger than that of the church. A significant
facet of their effort was that, for the first time, large numbers of younger
persons, whether recent immigrants or young people of Greek descent, took
initiatives and played an important role in the campaign.
The last category includes a rather formless aggregation of individuals
and small groups whom we could call, more for convenience's than for pre-
cision's sake, the professional elite of the Greek-American community. It
consists of academics, students, professionals of various kinds. Generaliza-
tions are extremely difficult here. During the dictatorship, this group (along
with recent immigrant laborers and skilled workers) provided many of those
who actively opposed the junta -- although some of its supporters were also
found among them, along with a large proportion of those who neither assist-
ed the dictatorship nor worked against it. The contacts and channels which
had been established by many antidictatorship groups with American politic-
ians were particularly useful in promoting the campaign on Cyprus and the
arms embargo. It is no accident that most Congressional leaders of the aid ban
struggle had also been active in the efforts against the dictatorship.
During the period when the aid ban issue was most active, several ad
hoc groups, committees and organizations sprang up. The two most impor-
tant (and longest lasting) among them were the United Hellenic American
Congress and the American Hellenic Institute.22 The former is closely assoc-
iated with the church and has directed its efforts at grass-roots mobilization
of the Greek-American community. The latter has more of an elite orienta-
tion, its major effectiveness being its ability to coordinate and assist the
activities of members of Congress engaged in the aid ban campaign. Both
groups are essentially conservative (in terms of foreign policy and Greek
politics) and tend to focus their attacks on Turkey (rather than the Greek
junta or United States policies).
It is evident that, at most levels of the Greek-American community,
leadership in the campaign for the aid ban was in the hands of relatively
conservative elements. While progressive individuals and groups participated
actively in the campaign, they were not, in the main, in leadership roles --
they were not the ones President Ford and Secretary Kissinger talked with, or
whose comments were reported in the mass media. Indeed, by and large the
leadership on the "Greek lobby" side was more conservative than the
Congressional protagonists in the struggle, whether of Greek origin or not.
In Congress, it was people like Senator Eagleton and Representatives
Brademas, Rosenthal and Sarbanes that took the lead. These are liberals,
of varying degrees of orthodoxy; more conservative politicians were also
found among those voting for the aid ban, but not in leadership roles.
The conservative orientation of the Greek-Americans openly leading
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the aid ban campaign may have been helpful in promoting their cause, in view
of the general lack of any desire radically to contest established foreign policy
tenets among Congressional proponents of the aid ban. Nevertheless, it may
also have had some negative impact. Their concern with avoiding broader
attack on United States policies toward Greece and Cyprus or any "undue"
emphasis on the.role and responsibility of the Greek junta, although frequent-
ly justified on tactical grounds, may have ultimately lessened the strength of
the community's efforts. The lack of any expression of alarm or opposition
by the Greek lobby prinicipals to the coup d'etat that overthrew Makarios
and invited the Turkish invasion, the participation, and indeed prominence, in
the lobbying efforts of persons who had assisted and defended the Greek
junta raised difficult problems of consistency and gave easy arguments to the
aid embargo's opponents, who waxed sarcastic on the belated appearance of a
democratic and legalist conscience among many representatives of the
"Greek lobby." 23
In the absence of thorough empirical studies, 24 it is hard to determine,
with any claim to reasonable validity, how effective were the activities of the
individuals and groups, collectively called -- by their opponents -- the "Greek
lobby," to what extent they determined or seriously influenced the position
of the majority of the members of Congress between the summer of 1974 and
the fall of 1975. That some political pressure was exerted, and felt, is clear
Beyond this no one can go, at present. One should note, however, that the
votes on the aid ban issue are distributed, in the main, in predictable manner
across the political spectrum. . Despite some notable exceptions, most Demo-
crats, Liberals, and Administration critics voted for the aid ban; most Repub-
licans, conservatives and proponents of Administration policies voted against
it. And it is useful to remember that, during the dictatorship in Greece, some
of these leaders of Greek-American associations and groups had sought, with
strong support from the Administration, to influence legislators in a manner
favorable to the Greek junta. Their efforts failed; Congress' stand was much
less favorable to the junta than the executive's.
It follows from all this that the decisive importance of the activities of
the "Greek Lobby" in the Congressional struggle for the cutoff of aid to
Turkey is by no means certain. It is important to remembei once again that it
was the opponents of the aid ban who, directly or indirectly, gave special
attention and publicity to the role of the "Greek lobby," in part taking
advantage of the publicity given to its campaign and to the self-promotional
efforts of many of its "leaders." In its confidential briefings, the Department
of State stressed that this new lobby was most effective; the position (and
vote) of a majority of Congressmen was attributed to an effort to capture
Greek-American votes -- in contrast, of course, to the objective position of
the executive branch which kept in mind only the national interest. Similar
points were made by Congressional opponents of the aid ban. Even the
Turkish Prime Minister has repeatedly referred to the role of the "Greek
lobby" and has attributed to it and to the machinations of the Greek govern-
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ment Turkey's difficulties with the United States Congress.
The Aid Ban Issue As A Constitutional Conflict
The fundamental conflict between the President and an important
number of members of Congress over the arms embargo concerns the degree
and the manner of participation of Congress in making and applying decisions
concerning the country's foreign policy. The President and his Secretary of
State insist that Congress has an advisory role in this area, never a decision-
making one. The evolution of American constitutional structures and policies
in the past forty years tends to support this view. Ever since the time of the
New Deal, the initiative as well as the final decisions in matters of foreign
policy have been increasingly in the hands of the President (and, of course,
his Secretaries of State and Defense). Only in the areas of commercial and
economic relations has Congress retained a role which is to some extent
autonomous and which is usually manifested not by taking initiatives but by
refusing to accept Presidential proposals, until some compromise is reached.
With respect to most other topics, Congress has found it sufficient in the past
forty years to authorize the President to act within broad discretionary
bounds or to approve his actions ex post facto. Secretary Kissinger goes
perhaps even further when he insists that Congress not only must not make
any of the decisions in matters of foreign policy but must also support -- i.e.,
must not criticize or undermine -- all Presidential decisions.
Most of the members of Congress who disagreed with the President on
the continuation of aid to Turkey are trying to stop and to reverse this evolu-
tion of constitutional policy. They argue that Congress is competent to
decide along with the President on the principles which govern the country's
general foreign policy. They stress that the executive cannot subvert or
violate such principles, once they are established, any time it would be con-
, venient to do so. They insist that it is not enough for the President to inform
Congress of his final decisions on foreign policy but that he must keep Con-
gress informed and must consult with its members during the actual process
of decision-making and implementing. It is this fundamental constitutional
issue that is at the center of the dispute concerning aid to Turkey, as it is in
other recent disputes between the President and Congress.
For those immediately involved, the central issue in the aid ban dispute
is not the substantive one, the Cyprus problem and United States relations
with Greece and Turkey, but the question of competence, the jurisdictional
issue: who decides concerning the foreign affairs of the United States -- more
precisely, since the central role of the executive is not disputed, to what
extent- is Congress to participate actively in the development of foreign
policy?
Substantive issues did affect, of course, in various ways and to varying
degrees. the position of many of those involved. Each of the substantive
arguments (i.e., indignation at Turnish aggression, resistance to Turkish
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blackmail over the bases, concern for the legality of United States action,
and, on the other side, belief in the need for the bases in Turkey, or in the
need for flexibility in the executive's response) probably reflects issues that
had some influence on some people. Additional, more or less extraneous,
considerations were also of some importance. Turkey's reneging on promises
concerning opium cultivation were clearly of determining significance in
some instances. Then, several people in both parties were, by late 1974,
strongly opposed to the policies and perhaps especially the political style
of Secretary Henry Kissinger. The reason for this opposition are many and
sometimes contradiCtory; some consider him far too soft and not aggressive
enough, others too conservative and ruthless. 25 The arms embargo gave
some people an opportunity to do something to express their opposition.
It is also important that the aid ban issue came to Congress in a par-
ticular legal posture, since American politics are particularly susceptible to
legal arguments. Americans often give legal formulations to their problems, so
as to resolve them on the basis of legal reasoning (broadly defined) rather
than as political or economic problems. The manner in which Kissinger
handled the entire issue, by essentially admitting an open violation of legal
rules and principles, was ultimately favorable to the position of the Congress
majority on the issues of jurisdiction and allocation of power.
Precisely because the issue is not primarily one of substance but is re-
lated to basic problems of constitutional structure, one should not have
expected that a clearcut and final solution would have been given. It was
possible to predict from the start that Congress would eventually give in.
To begin with, Congress faces basic structural problems which limit radically
both its capability and its will to oppose the President in matters of foreign
policy. In the issue at hand, its main purpose had been achieved the moment
the issue came to the fore. Congressional claims concerning allocation of
jurisdiction had now been posed; once this was done, the substantive problem
was to a great number of members of Congress of limited interest. On this
topic, as on so many others, Congress is not united and has no single position.
Many of its members wholeheartedly accept the view that foreign affairs is
the exclusive responsibility of the President. Others find the utilization of aid
as a means to exert pressure improper and ineffective. The lack of any radical
disagreement concerning the basic principles of American foreign policy was
also of significance. The debate concerned only means, not ends. Such con-
siderations as the danger of "loss" of Turkish bases or the degree of immed-
iate effectiveness of the aid ban acquired in this context particular impor-
tance.
Some Concluding Observations
The Turkish aid ban episode was essentially a United States domestic
issue, reflecting the current phase in the secular struggle for predominance
between Congress and the President. That it happened at this time, and with
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respect to this particular issue, was due no doubt to a constellation of special
circumstances. The currect lack of a well-settled consensus on foreign policy
issues set the stage for a conflict of this type, although, as already noted,
there was little fundamental disagreement on principles and basic directions
in this particular case.
As with most historical events, many of the more fundamental issues
raised were not given any clear or definite answer. The effectiveness of
manipulation of aid as a means of pressure was not really tested, in view of
Secretary Kissinger's actions in undermining any such effects. The question of
the legitimacy of such manipulation, obscured by the legal posture of the
issues in this instance, remains a difficult one.
For politically progressive Greek-Americans and Greeks, the role of the
"Greek lobby," and the Greek-American community in general, raised an-
other set of problems. Was the effort to stop aid to Turkey, in which most
progressive Greek-Americans participated, worthwhile? Or was it predestined
to failure, or indeed, given the conservative orientation of "Greek lobby"
leaders and the lack of fundamental disagreement on policy among Con-
gressional opponents, did the effort have the unintended effect of increasing
the legitimacy of orthodox policy positions? To state the issue at its most
extreme, was the whole aid ban campaign a farce, calculated to disorient and
neutralize possible Greek efforts of disengagement from United States in-
fluence and planned and directed in its every detail by "dark forces" in
United States (and Greek) politics?
One's answer can only reflect personal perception and convictions. To
the extent that the "farce" argument is based on a perception of United
States politics as monolithic and subtly but fully manipulated, to the extent
it assumes that "dark forces" are in total control and possess the capacity
entirely to cover their traces, it may be counterargued that everyday exper-
ience as well as more systematic study do not bear out such a view. The
complexities of real-life political interactions refute the dogmatic purity of
the positions described. One is forced to choose among a limited number of
positions and activities available at a particular time. Sitting it out and
criticizing the "inevitable" outcome is no substitute for becoming involved
and attempting, however hopelessly, to affect events. That those who
opposed the arms embargo, starting with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
felt seriously threatened by it seems today undeniable. Moreover, in
struggling against it, the Administration and its supporters had to give up
their impartial, benevolent, outsider's stance and to make clearer their
involvement and the considerations on which they base their choice. If it had
achieved only this "demystification," in such concrete and clear context, the
aid ban campaign whould have been justified.
Afterword
The agreement on the status of the United States bases in Turkey, sign-
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ed on March 26, 1976, by Secretary Kissinger and Turkish Foreign Minister
Caglayangil, is part of Kissinger's counter attack in his war with Congress
over control of foreign policy. Blithely disregarding the aid ban agitation of
the last year and a half, the Secretary of State undertook to provide to
Turkey in the next four years one billion dollars (one fifth of it in outright
grants). He chose thus to reaffirm his government's unambiguous support for
Turkey. amnlv rewarding her for the invasion of Cyprus, for her intransigence
since 1974, and for her blackmail over the bases. This clear assertion of sup-
port comes at a time when negotiations over Cyprus are deadlocked, because
of Turkey's refusal to consider any settlement not totally on her own terms,
and when Turkey's provocation statements concerning her claims over the
Aegean have created a tense, warlike atmosphere between Turkey and Greece.
The Secretary's gesture cannot therefore be seen merely as an expres-
sion of concern with "security," military might and foreign bases. It has
several important dimensions. With respect to the Soviet Union, it is a reasser-
tion of the predominance of a Cold War approach to military and political
objectives. As regards Greece, it is a well-calculated move designed to humil-
iate and weaken the administration of Premier Karamanlis, with which he is
currently negotiating on the fate of United States and NATO bases there and
whose efforts towards a more independent stance raise for the Secretary the
specter of a Greece which is no longer under the total control of the United
States, while remaining within the "Western" camp. Karamanlis' enemies, on
the right as well as the left, can now point at the ineffectuality of his moder-
ate approach and his failure to temper in any way the continuing encourage-
ment by the United States of Turkey's intransigence. Kissinger's move is also
a challenge to Congress, daring it to vote down the aid proposals -- now
expressly tied to the status of the United States bases. The Congressional
"foreign policy leaders" are already reported to have assured him that his
ploy has good chances of success. It remains to be seen whether Congress
will once again acquiesce, thus regaining the docile and humble status it
had, on foreign policy matters, until a few years ago.
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